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ABSTRACT 
As it is new to the political realm, there are still a lot of questions to be asked and research to do 
with regards to right wing populism: how it functions, why it exists, what it is, and where we go 
from here. This essay will answer these questions, as well as investigate recent wins and losses for 
major far-right parties and movements across the globe. In seeking to answer these questions, I 
find that right-populism is not, in fact, the political fad many expect it to be and if it is to ever lose 
popularity, will likely only be pushed into obscurity by a major large-scale global event, or eclipsed 
by a more powerful political movement. In the short term, the COVID-19 pandemic and left-wing 
populism are right-wing populism’s biggest challengers, but neither have seemed to make a big 
enough dent in the power of right-populism for it to be considered a loss for the far-right just yet. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, political scientists across the globe have been baffled by the rise of 
populism, a “thin” ideology or rhetorical strategy often used by demagogues that pits the “pure 
people” against the “corrupt elite.” 1 The term “populism” has existed for centuries now, starting 
in the late 1800s with the Populist Party in the United States. The Populist Party, a left-wing group, 
led by William Jennings Bryan, was primarily made up of farmers. The Populists believed that the 
“big-wigs” in DC had forgotten about the hard-working farmers of Middle America as they 
continued to pass policies that disenfranchised the farmers while watching from their ivory towers. 
As a result, the farmers formed the Populist Party, advocating for the “pure people” (the farmers) 
over the “corrupt elite.” They endorsed policies like a graduated income tax and direct election of 
Senators, both policies that exist in today’s United States. Although no member of the Populist 
Party ever held as high an office as President, they were very effective in Congress at lobbying for 
their policies and speaking for the “little man.” 2 
 
These pro-worker, anti-corporatist populist ideals quickly spread their way across the 
world, notably in the Global South and Latin America. For the next century, the western world 
seldom used the term “populism” aside from describing these labor movements in the Global 
South. These movements include Thomas Sankara’s Populist Revolution in Burkina Faso, based 
on the teachings of Karl Marx, and the campaigns of Argentina’s Juan Perón and Brazil’s Getúlio 
Vargas.3 However, populism re-emerged in the West during the late 20th century,  showing a much 
harsher face. Since 1990, the number of populists in power around the world has increased 
                                                        
1 Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017. 
2 de Wit, Maywa Montenegro et. al. Agrarian origins of authoritarian populism in the United States. Journal of 
Rural Studies, 2019. 
3 Abankwa, Daniel. Populism: Utility of its Approaches and the Prospects of the Phenomenon’s Resurgence in 
America. Journal of Social and Developmental Sciences, 2021. 
Trivanovic                “The State of Populism” 
 74 
fivefold4, but instead of labor movements representing economic populism, most populists today 
are “cultural” populists that lie on the far-right of a hypothetical political spectrum. While countries 
in the Global South such as Bolivia and Venezuela still have strong left-populist movements, the 
traditional left-wing definition of the term has gone nearly extinct in the West, save for a few 
“flickers of hope” in areas such as Greece, France, and Spain (which have all but fizzled out in 
due time).  
 
While left-wing populism has largely faded into obscurity, right-wing populism has 
dominated 21st-century politics. Nearly every post-industrial democracy has observed a strong and 
electorally viable far-right populist movement. Yet, despite this recent success, there is still much 
debate within the political science community about how populism will look throughout the rest 
of the century. On the one hand, many argue that the right-variety of populism is here to stay, as 
proven in its recent electoral success. But, on the other hand, it is certainly possible that massive 
public disapproval of how right-populist leaders have handled current crises such as recessions 
and the COVID crisis could lead to an implosion of the movement. If that is true, then what is to 
replace it? Will another political action begin to dominate world politics in the upcoming years? 
What political movement will garner enough working class support to succeed globally and how? 
This essay seeks to explore these questions as well as how right-wing populism in the 21st century 
has gotten so voguish, how left-wing populism has observed lost interest, and where the state of 
global populism may head amidst an uncertain outlook.  
 
The New Populism 
 
Starting in the 1990s, right-wing populism began to find its way into the rhetorical 
strategies and ideologies of many significant political figures globally, such as The Netherlands’ 
Pim Fortuyn, France’s Jean Marie Le Pen, and Austria’s Jörg Haider.5 Right-wing populism adds 
another layer to the “us vs. them” mentality for what populism is known. The “pure people” are 
culturally homogenous, typically identifying themselves as a “silent majority” and aligning 
themselves with a notion of “common sense.” At the same time, the group of “corrupt elites” also 
encompasses immigrants and minorities (who are supposedly favored by the government elites). 
This form of populism is has become common in today’s global political sphere, gaining massive 
swaths of power in countries like Brazil, Italy, Hungary, the UK, Turkey, and Australia6. 
 
Why is Right-Wing Populism so Powerful? 
 
 Right-wing populism has become very popular, but the answer to why this is has caused 
much debate amongst political scientists. One hypothesis comes from Margaret Canovan of Keele 
University in England. Canovan states that democracy presents “two faces”: a pragmatic side and 
a redemptive side to politics. These two sides often clash, as they are opposed yet interdependent. 
In between “lies a gap in which populism is liable to appear.” Canovan explains the pragmatic side 
of politics as the side made up of institutions and “systems of processing conflicts without killing 
one another.” However, the redemptive side is the notion that a government should be “of the 
                                                        
4 Kyle, Jordan, et. al. Populists in Power Across the World. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2020. 
5 Eatwell, Roger. Introduction: The New Extreme Right Challenge. Routledge Press, 2003.  
6 Wike, Richard et. al. Globally, Broad Support for representative and direct democracy. Pew Research Center, 
2017. 
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people, by the people, and for the people,” and people are often prone to emotional responses.7 A 
thriving democracy can find the balance between the two faces to keep everyone pleased; a safe, 
strong, and prosperous state held up by institutions, where the people feel as though they are in 
control. However, Canovan highlights that the conflicts between the faces of democracy have 
gotten worse in the 21st century due to political elites in countries worldwide ignoring the 
redemptive “face,” therefore ignoring “the will of the people.”8 In Europe, institutions like the EU 
continue to grow in power and influence, mandating refugee quotas for countries like Spain and 
Italy, much to the demise of ordinary folk who “don’t like to see the demographics of their country 
changing.”9 When candidates promise to care about the people’s voice at the expense of the 
institutions and “elites,” it frequently comes across as a pleasant change of pace. 
 
 Another theory comes from Peter A. Hall of Harvard University, in what he calls the “third-
rung phenomenon.” Suppose you ask a group of people to imagine a ladder with ten rungs (with 
the first rung representing the lowest social status and the tenth rung of the highest social status). 
In that case, a disproportionate amount of people nowadays will put themselves somewhere around 
the third rung due to an extreme lack of social mobility in some of the world’s largest superpowers, 
such as the US. Putting themselves on the third rung means that they know they have something 
to lose, but are still near the bottom, have been that way, and wish to be higher. Because of this, 
“third-rungers” are the group most prone to right-wing populist arguments and tend to support 
right-wing populist politicians. They know the “elites” are above them and thus believe that 
“elites” constantly attempt to push the ordinary person down the ladder in favor of those currently 
below them.10 The “first and second-rungers” that serve as scapegoats for the far-right politicians 
vary by country. In Spain, for example, they tend to be refugees and feminists. As a result, Santiago 
Abascal’s far-right Vox movement has observed immense popularity in Spain scapegoating these 
groups. In the United States, they are immigrants (typically working-class and from Mexico or 
Central America) and black people. Hall concludes that due to the lack of social mobility of the 
working class in a capitalist world and dissociation between the political elites and working class 
in many countries, populism has a large gap to fill.11 
 
 Lastly, the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, known as the “father of modern populism,” 
has a different notion of why populism is so popular today. He believes that the reactions of various 
political movements in trying to curb populism have strengthened the populist movement rather 
than weakening it. That allows for populist movements to grow in size and strength that they 
maintain over time. He states that when political campaigns try to shame populism and limit their 
membership, populism only grows stronger because they value output over input and leadership 
over participation.12 Populism thrives on having the loudest and most compelling voices in the 
room instead of having the most members with pragmatic trains of thought. As a result, populist 
leaders look to have the most devout followers at their core with room to grow. Mudde also states 
that the global narrative of the “war on terror,” set by the US and Britain, made it easy for 
                                                        
7 Canovan, Margaret. Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. Political Science Journal, 1999. 
8 Ibid 
9 Bruneau, Emile. The unique effects of blatant dehumanization on attitudes and behavior towards Muslim refugees 
during the European ‘refugee crisis’ across four countries. European Journal of Social Psychology, 2018. 
10 Gidron, Noam and Peter A. Hall. Populism as a problem of social integration. Comparative Political Studies, 
2020. 
11 Hall, Peter A. The Shifting Relationship Between Postwar Capitalism and Democracy. Harvard University, 2021. 
12 Mudde, Cas. The Populist Zeitgeist: Government and Opposition. Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
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immigration, Islam, and security to become the “hot-topic” issues of the 21st century, the main 
talking points of the far-right.13 
 
 Each of these theories seems to have a significant degree of validity. Not only are they 
essential to discuss why far-right populism has taken over mainstream politics, but we can also use 
these theories to discuss a hypothetical downfall of right-wing populism. If these far-right leaders 
no longer uphold a convincing redemptive side to their politics, can no longer effectively scapegoat 
historically oppressed populations, or can be drowned out by another political campaign that 
embraces populism, they essentially have nothing to stand on. I will revisit this notion later after 
further discussion and theory-building concerning similar world-scale political movements. 
 
Similar “Trends” in Global Politics 
 
 It is certainly possible that this far-right brand of populism is, in essence, a fad and is not 
here to stay. Many political scientists have dedicated their careers to arguing that the mere 
existence of time will render right-populism useless in the upcoming years. This reasoning comes 
from the observation that there have been many voguish “fad”-like trends observed in the way 
people prefer their politics. Still, these have often faded out after time invalidates them or a large-
scale event makes them irrelevant. For example, the voting population of the United States used 
to value military experience as one of the essential traits in a President. Now, such accreditation 
rarely crosses one’s mind when filling out their ballot, as three out of the last four American 
Presidents had no experience in the military. Many people now actually prefer someone seen as 
an “outsider” instead of someone with experience. Perhaps Americans have begun to distrust the 
military. Perhaps Americans underwent a paradigm shift after observing the weighty foreign policy 
stances taken by Presidents Obama and Clinton despite no military experience. Any conclusions 
drawn from this data would be circumstantial at best. All we know is that military service is no 
longer a significant factor in deciding who would be a better President in the eyes of the American 
public. This preference was a trend. For years, political scientists have been discussing the 
phenomenon of populism in the Western world as a trend. The current discussion has shifted: 
should right-wing populism still be considered a trend with an end to its appeal on the horizon, or 
is it here to stay? 
 
Why Right-Populism is Here to Stay 
 
 There are various arguments as to why right-wing populism won’t be going anywhere for 
quite a while. Mainly, left-leaning (or even center to center-right) movements globally have 
consistently failed to defeat far-right parties in elections, despite their best efforts. In fact, on 
balance, far-right parties have continued to grow in support the longer they’ve been in office 
throughout this century.14 All across the globe, far-right leaders are enjoying immense popularity 
and continue to win elections. Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, The Philippines’ 
Rodrigo Duterte, India’s Narendra Modi, and the PiS Party in Poland are enjoying record-high 
levels of support domestically (no matter how unpopular they remain abroad). These levels of 
support could partially be attributed to the weakening of the free press and constitutional courts 
                                                        
13 Mudde, Cas. Europe’s Populist Surge: A Long Time in the Making. Foreign Affairs, 2016. 
14 Borg, Karl. The radicalization of politics in Europe: the rise of the far-right in the age of austerity. University of 
Malta, 2014. 
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that these governments have all pushed for, effectively destroying their once-existent democracies, 
but regardless, the ideals that they uphold persist. Even when right-populists lose elections or are 
ousted from office (i.e., France’s Marine Le Pen, The United States’ Donald Trump), they continue 
to have a strong base of ardent supporters who have shifted the Overton window (the everchanging 
spectrum or range of politically acceptable ideas within a population)15 of their respective countries 
into uncharted territories. Furthermore, handing right-populists a loss in an election is incredibly 
difficult. In a meta-analysis done by Yascha Mounk, Professor at Johns Hopkins University in 
2020, results showed that six years after they are first elected, populist leaders are twice as likely 
as non-populist leaders to still be in power; twelve years after they are first elected, they are more 
than five times as likely.16 
 
These ideas spread rapidly; countries who haven’t yet seen an executive dominated by 
right-populist ideals may very well see one soon. Countries like Denmark and Finland have far-
right populist parties in the metaphoric “passenger’s seat” of their legislatures, making up the main 
opposition (and starting to “backseat drive” the policy direction of the majority on issues like 
immigration). More and more Danes and Finns are identifying as “nationalists” each year. The 
aforementioned Vox in Spain has seen a meteoric rise, and many political scientists keep an eye 
on them ahead of the upcoming elections in Spain, especially with the popularity of the Sánchez 
premiership remaining uncertain during the COVID crisis.17 The far-right Italian party, Brothers 
of Italy, the only major Italian political party to not join the newly formed broad government 
coalition led by Mario Draghi, has become the next most popular Italian party in mere months.18 
 
 This newfound success of right populists is much to the dismay of social democratic and 
traditional conservative parties, many of whom now see historically low support. Moreover, most 
efforts of these parties have been futile in countering the influence of the far-right. Mudde finds 
that traditional parties will most often cave into right-populist parties and adopt some of their 
policy proposals to “win back the working class.” He highlights European leaders like Macron, 
who have pivoted towards a more “authoritarian” stance on issues like immigration in recent 
campaigning. Unfortunately, this proves rather detrimental for multiple reasons. 
 
 I. Mudde explains that if these parties like En Marche! or the SPD in Germany continue to 
pivot right, nothing fundamentally changes.19 These pivots do nothing to stop right-wing populism 
and only delay the inevitable. Suppose “moderate” parties begin to agree with far-right parties on 
issues such as immigration. In that case, the people will come to the realization (or illusion) that 
the far-right was almost prophetic in predicting the problems for which every politician suddenly 
cares. Additionally, when these “moderate” parties change their policy positions to reflect what 
they believe the working class embodies based on their support for far-right populism, the populists 
have effectively won to frame the current political climate. This notion of the left creates a slippery 
                                                        
15 Karpenko, Oleksandr Valentinovich. The Overton Window as a Manipulative Mechanism of Public Values 
Transformation. National Academy of Culture and Arts Management Ukraine, 2019. 
16 Mounk, Yascha and Jordan Kyle, What Populists Do to Democracies. The Atlantic, 2018. 
17 Vampa, Davide. Competing forms of populism and territorial politics. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 
2020. 
18 de Luca, Marino. The new Draghi government and the face of populism in Italy. London School of Economics, 
2021. 
19 Mudde, Cas. Why Copying The Populist Right Isn’t Going To Save The Left. The Guardian, 2019 
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slope. When the traditionally or economically liberal parties that previously dominated European 
elections continue to lose recent polls to the far-right, what other “compromises” will they make? 
Is climate policy next? Will we see another exodus of countries leaving the EU like Britain or flat 
out ignoring EU demands like Hungary? 
 
 II. The opposition has failed to make any sufficient gains in suppressing the ideas of right-
populism in the long term. Even if this “pivoting” works short-term, liberal parties tend to 
overvalue small victories. Look no further than Poland: in the 2007 elections, the center-right 
“establishment” Civic Platform Party recovered well after considerable losses to the far-right PiS 
in previous elections. At this point, Civic Platform became the Polish government and ousted PiS 
from power. While in power for eight years, the Polish people were disappointed at the lack of 
substantive policy change brought about by Civic Platform, which led to PiS regaining power and 
growing more prominent and popular than ever before.20 Ever since, PiS has continued to gain 
clout and support by eroding press freedoms, stacking constitutional courts, and restricting free 
speech and immigration. Civic Platform has yet to recover from these losses, while PiS’ popularity 
is sky high.  
 
Mudde predicts a similar observation in the United States in the coming years.21 After the 
recent electoral defeat of Donald Trump, many Democrats already believe that they’ve “won back 
the Rust Belt” and that the Blue Wave has reached its crest, never to crash again. Assuming this 
would be nonsense. Donald Trump was leading polls by double digits before an inadequate 
response to the COVID crisis.22 The American people didn’t suddenly become repulsed by the 
ideals of right-populism overnight; they didn’t have a choice. What happens if the Republicans 
nominate another politically popular right-populist like Tom Cotton or Ron DeSantis to be their 
Presidential nominee in 2024? The Democrats have far from won back working-class support, and 
they won’t do it without making substantial efforts to better the lives of the working-class people 
of America. The same goes for social democratic parties in European democracies, such as 
Germany’s SPD, Britain’s Labour Party, Spain’s PSOE, and more. 
 
Failures of Modern Social Democrats 
 
 The question then remains; why has it become so hard for social democratic parties to make 
substantial reform for the working class? The answer is twofold: First, as previously discussed, 
liberal parties have become infatuated in making compromises with far-right parties to stay 
“electable” in their own eyes. Playing electoral politics and becoming obsessed with optics 
distracts politicians from making reforms genuinely “for the people.” Democrats in the United 
States are shaking in their boots, terrified of coming out to support policies like the Green New 
Deal and Medicare for All. They are most worried about being branded radicals by their opposition 
(despite polls showing 70%+ approval amongst Americans for these “radical” policies). Second, 
reform for the working class can only go so far within a capitalist economy. If capitalists still own 
the means of production in any system, workers will always feel disenfranchised and in a state of 
                                                        
20 Szczerbiak, Aleks. An anti-establishment backlash that shook up the party system. Journal of European Politics 
and Society, 2017. 
21 Mudde, Cas. Why Copying The Populist Right Isn’t Going To Save The Left. The Guardian, 2019 
22 Erikson, Robert S. and Christopher Wlezien. Forecasting the 2020 Presidential Election. Political Science and 
Politics, 2021. 
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wage slavery. Likely, it’s not so much the policy of far-right groups that bring them such great 
appeal in the eyes of ordinary people, but the fact that they stand for change and the ideals of the 
government looking out for the “everyday” working-class citizen. If social democrats decide they 
will adopt right-wing immigration policies, they won’t gain any support from right-populists. 
National Rally supporters in France aren’t flocking to support Macron; this would be illogical.  
 
 This malleability is the problem with traditional social-democratic political parties. They 
should not treat the working class like pawns, solely focusing on their benefits within an electoral 
system. To garner working-class support, social democracy (or socialism) needs to be revitalized, 
and the idea of working-class-centered politics needs to stay in the mainstream. Otherwise, it is 
incredibly easy for the working class to become infatuated with the scapegoated politics of the far-
right.23 It’s challenging to defeat right-populists in national elections without local support and 
community organization. I argue for organizers to start at the local level by enlightening the 
working-class and pushing for class consciousness while strengthening the vehicles of working-
class mobilization within the democratic system, such as trade unions. Without this mass 
organization, I would argue that right-populism will grow to be the preferred politics of much of 
the working class. 
 
Could We Be Turning a Corner Already? 
 
 However, there are also arguments about why this new form of populism could be on its 
last leg. The reason for this mainly lies with COVID-19. Historically, political ideals tend to shift 
amongst the masses during and after large-scale crises. The most significant gains acquired by far-
right parties in Europe, in particular, happened following the financial collapse and global 
recession in 201024. No crisis in recent history has been more significant in scope and scale than 
COVID-19. Nearly 200 million people have suffered from the disease worldwide, and well over 
four million people have died25. During crises of this scale, people can’t help but blame the political 
administrations in charge. 
 
Additionally, many of the countries hit the hardest by the pandemic have had right-populist 
leaders in charge of handling the COVID procedure. As previously mentioned, the main reason 
Donald Trump lost re-election in the United States is due to how the pandemic has hit America 
hard. It did not help that President Trump refused to acknowledge the benefits of mask-wearing, 
social distancing, and other recommended COVID-deterrents until hundreds of thousands of 
Americans, many of those his ardent supporters, had already suffered. The United States never 
went into a single nationwide lockdown. While President Trump still has a group of staunch 
supporters that agree with his every move during the pandemic, many Americans were all but 
forced to look at the ordinary lives of others across the globe. New Zealand summers were filled 
with music festivals and beach vacations after essentially conquering the pandemic following their 
strong (and early) response. 
 
This disappointment in far-right leaders during the pandemic is not an isolated American 
issue. Far-right parties all across Europe saw substantial losses throughout 2020. For example, 
                                                        
23 Kitschelt, Herbert. The Radical Right in Western Europe. The University of Michigan Press, 1995. 
24 Funke, Manuel, et. al. The Financial Crisis is Still Empowering Far-Right Populists, Foreign Affairs, 2018. 
25 COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, Worldometer, July 2021. 
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Greece’s ascendant far-right household name Golden Dawn saw a massive hit to their popularity 
and is now officially branded by Greeks (and many abroad) as neo-Nazis.26 Simon Schütz of the 
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University illustrates the 
bind that right-populist parties have faced during the pandemic, highlighting Germany’s AfD.  
 
Schütz finds that COVID has caused countries like Germany to resort to extreme measures, 
such as shutting down borders, giving massive swaths of funding to small businesses, and focusing 
primarily on national interests instead of supranational interests (such as the EU or WHO). Many 
of these policies have been advocated by far-right parties for years. In the last year, these policies 
have been forcibly thrust into the mainstream by politicians of all parties. Unfortunately, people 
are still worse off than they were before the pandemic. Economies have slowed down, crime is 
still high, and the working class has been laid off from their jobs in droves. The far-right promise 
has shown to be a failure. These policies have proved not to be the “cure-all” that parties like the 
AfD have promised they would be, which has led to splitting support for these parties.27 
 
The Far-Right Double-Bind 
 
 Now, far-right parties have two options. On the one hand, they can continue to stick to their 
wheelhouse and envision this dwindling support as a short-term issue. Perhaps they can phrase this 
as a win for the far-right at the end of the day. Many traditionally far-right policies found their way 
into the mainstream. The problem with this idea, Schütz continues, is that these parties no longer 
have their immense populist appeal. If everyone from social democrats to conservatives to greens 
advocates for their policies, they are no longer outsiders but effectively the “establishment” they 
continuously denounced. The popularity of parties that choose this path will undoubtedly take a 
hit.28  
 
On the other hand, with dwindling support, far-right parties could try to do something to 
reinvigorate their base and continue to be contrarian, pivoting even further to the fringes of the 
political spectrum. Many AfD members have resorted to joining the Querdenker movement, a 
loose grouping of libertarians, vaccination opponents, and conspiracy theorists that has steadily 
gained support for its protest rallies against government health restrictions and lockdowns. A 
recent poll showed that 24% of AfD members don’t believe in the pandemic and are under the 
impression that liberal governments across the world conspired to create the notion of this 
pandemic to create chaos discontent. These fringe beliefs are also sure to alienate voters. As a 
result, AfD’s support has slashed in half since 2018.29 At the very least, right-populist parties will 
fracture into two different camps: traditional right-populists and fringe conspiracy groups. It is 
much tougher for these splintered groups to survive on their own in an electoral system. While 
AfD is still polling in fourth place ahead of the 2021 German federal elections later this year, their 
support is still on a downwards trend and they did not fare well in many of the local elections that 
took place earlier this year. 
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With dwindling support over their COVID response worldwide, political scientists will 
have to wait and see what the outcome will be for right-populists. However, many right-populist 
parties still saw increases in their voter base during 2020, primarily when led by figures with a cult 
of personality (i.e., Viktor Orbán30 and Narendra Modi31). Even if right-populism takes a massive 
hit in the coming years, it is unlikely it will completely disappear like other political trends before 
it. 
 
A Return to the Left? 
 
 If right-populism continues to lose support in post-industrial democracies globally, what 
will be the next political belief to replace its popularity? Many political scientists believe that 
global politics may see a return to the “traditional” populism of the left. This shift could be a 
critical development, as left-populism provides the type of focus on the working class that Mudde 
finds so integral to global democracies today. I would contend that the far-right’s “anti-
establishment” calls for supporting the “little man” are not what makes them so dangerous. Instead, 
I believe that their poisonous cocktail of xenophobia, racism, and authoritarianism that is spoon-
fed to the masses across the globe is what makes them threatening. Left-populism gives an 
alternative to its right counterpart without spewing hate and ignorance. That is not to say that left-
populism is a cure-all; it certainly has its flaws. However, left-populism may be the most 
straightforward transition to make from right-populism. Often, left-populist parties can poach 
supporters from the far-right with more inclusive calls for corporate accountability and working-
class support. These parties and politicians classified as “left-populists” incorporate a wide area of 
the political spectrum. I will also refer to them throughout this article as left-wing, leftist, and 
socialist, despite the “scary” and radical connotation that some of these terms have garnered in 
many post-industrial democracies in recent years. 
 
Is the Left Doomed to Fail? 
 
 However, it is tough to remain optimistic over the prospects of a sustainable global left-
populist movement, given its massive failures in recent years. Six years ago, international relations 
experts predicted that a new left-populist campaign was among us. After the global economic 
recession, left-wing parties started to pop up across Europe, rapidly gaining clout. Former 
Communist and current leader of Syriza, Alexis Tsipras became the Prime Minister of Greece, 
campaigning on rejecting EU calls for austerity measures against the Greeks. Jeremy Corbyn found 
himself as the leader of the British Labour Party, a party that rather conservative Blairites had 
primarily dominated throughout the 21st century thus far. Pablo Iglesias Turrión’s Unidas 
Podemos coalition was influencing Spanish politics in an unprecedented manner. Bernie Sanders 
was mere votes away from becoming the Democratic nominee to take on Donald Trump for the 
Presidency. Six years later, all these movements have failed. In the most recent elections, Syriza 
was dominated by New Democracy, a liberal-conservative party, removing Tsipras from his seat 
as Prime Minister.32 Corbyn was ousted from his leadership in the Labour Party, replaced by the 
unremarkable Keir Starmer.33 Iglesias became the Vice President in an increasingly unpopular and 
                                                        
30 Cervenka, Eve. Public Opinion in the United States and Hungary. International ResearchScape Journal, 2020. 
31 Batra, Jagdish. The two years of Modi rule. Jindal Global University, 2021. 
32 Rori, Lamprini. The 2019 Greek Parliamentary Election. West European Politics, 2020. 
33 Martell, Luke. Beyond factionalism to unity: Labour under Starmer. Renewal Journal, 2020. 
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rather conservative Spanish government led by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, with limited 
influence on policy after an underwhelming performance in both 2019 elections. He retired from 
politics completely after the 2021 Madrilenian regional election, facing pressure from a massive 
outpour of death threats addressed to him and his family for his political beliefs and the fact 
Podemos failed to gain even 8% of the total vote.34 Sanders once again lost the Democratic 
nomination in 2020 and (arguably prematurely) endorsed a Biden presidency without securing a 
single seat for the left in Biden’s cabinet.35 How could this be? Is left-populism doomed to fail? 
 
 These movements had one thing in common: they caved into moderate-led demands within 
their respective electoral systems. The reality may be that these leftist movements cannot survive 
within any electoral systems without compromising that will eventually prove damning to their 
cause. Many of these recent movements, especially Tsipras’ Syriza (as well as most truly leftist 
movements; arguments can be made for many of these movements to be liberal social-democratic 
merely), take inspiration in their political philosophies and the way that they organize from leftist 
thinkers such as Marx, Lenin, and Luxemburg. All of them advocated for armed revolution as 
means of change, as opposed to bourgeois electoralism. Many have brushed these aspects of their 
theories to the side: calling for revolution will undoubtedly alienate most of the base that has 
supported these movements thus far. 
 
Additionally, today’s Greece, USA, and Spain’s material conditions are far different from 
late 20th century Germany and Russia. However, leftist movements trying to accumulate power 
within any existing political system is always a risky move. Predictions made by revolutionaries 
such as Mikhail Bakunin about leftist politics dating back to the 1870s have continued to ring true 
through to the present. 
 
Why the Left Has Been Unable to Change Their Fate 
 
 One of these predictions stated that leftists are wrong to think that they can enter the 
existing capitalist state, transform it from within, and use it as a tool to build towards a leftist 
society.36 Instead, the capitalist state, an inherently hierarchical institution that perpetuates the 
power of the economic and political ruling classes, will transform them. They will be gradually 
corrupted by power and will become concerned with expanding and maintaining it through any 
means (abolishing any electoral system, for example) rather than achieving their original goals. 
Bakunin predicted that socialist politicians would come to do awful things to preserve and expand 
their power while thinking they were doing it to advance their original causes. That’s because 
they’ve come to view themselves and their power as indispensable to their achievements of moving 
towards a “socialist” society. Look no further than figures like Lenin, Stalin, and Mao to see that 
this prediction has been fulfilled.  
 
The second prediction sounds even more familiar to today’s left-populists. If left-populists 
don’t become corrupted by power, they will enter an electoral system to garner as many votes as 
possible.37 Catering to electoralism inherently means a political shift towards a more “big-tent” 
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platform. It is necessary to gain votes from traditionally left-center or center-right voters to 
advance any policy. Thus, socialist parties will need to reduce their goal to making minor reforms 
to existing capitalist society and make alliances with existing bourgeois parties to form coalitions 
or successfully pass reforms. These compromises will continue to pile up until the original message 
of left-populism has diluted so much that there becomes no discernable difference between them 
and the bourgeois parties that they vowed to overthrow. 
 
As touched on previously, Syriza, British Labour, Unidas Podemos, and more could not 
escape this latter prediction and change their fates. To maintain the amount of popular support 
needed to keep his premiership, Tsipras caved in to the austerity measures proposed on the Greeks 
by the European troika that he vowed with never to work. He flirted with militarism in the Aegean 
Sea and sold Greek port access to China. Even this pivoting wasn’t enough to keep him in power, 
as Syriza lost its Parliamentary majority in 2019. British Labour MPs rallied around removing 
Corbyn from his leadership position once he was seen as “too radical” and unwilling to 
compromise with the opposition. This is despite Corbyn refusing to take a strong stance against 
Brexit. How much does the left need to bow down to their opponents to become “electable”? How 
much compromise is acceptable before it becomes immoral? Unidas Podemos is essentially a 
nonstarter in Spanish politics today; their approval ratings continue to fall as they become replaced 
by the insurgent Vox.  
 
How the Left Could Succeed 
 
 Despite all of this, political theorists like Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau believe that 
there is a future for left-populists, specifically if they start by campaigning on issues in an 
incredibly vague way (intentionally so). Their theories have been studied intensely over the last 
few years, with other electoral experts tweaking, critiquing, and providing their takes on the matter. 
Overall, the theory states that if left-populists start their campaigning around an anti-establishment, 
pro-working-class platform designed to accommodate causes and grievances supported by the 
masses, they can quickly get an outright majority of votes in most systems. The catch is that they 
have to not focus on policy-based rhetoric or identify with traditional leftists movements and 
phrases with poor connotations, such as “socialism.”38 This is because most of the world’s voters 
don’t own any capital or private property and are thus members of a class with inherent grievances 
in the current system that would identify with the rhetorical strategies of this party. However, 
words like socialism, communism, redistribution, and shifting ownership of the means of 
production still leave a bad taste in the mouth of many, especially in older generations who lived 
through or witnessed communism during the mid-20th century. 
 
Additionally, society continues to progress. We are now at a point where most post-
industrial democracies tend to have more egalitarian views on society (supporting gay rights, 
women’s rights, etc.). Once a party like this achieves a majority, there isn’t a need to make 
alliances with bourgeois parties. Instead, the left-populist party can start slowly dismantling 
oppressive mechanisms of capitalism from within. Think of these parties or political figures as 
“secret socialists.” Mouffe primarily has worked closely with France’s Jean Luc Melenchon and 
other European politicians to tweak this theory and possibly put it into effect. 
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Criticisms of Mouffe and Laclau 
 
 While, on paper, I am intrigued by Mouffe and Laclau’s theory, I remain highly skeptical 
for a variety of reasons: 
1. Voters are never 100% rational, and people frequently vote against their interests. Despite 
living as wage slaves, many working-class members with the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” 
mentality love the current system in which they live and work. 
2. People might care more about voting for non-progressive social issues than progressive 
economic issues. 
3. Recent elections across the globe have shown the effect that the late-20th and early-21st 
century campaign against socialist ideals has had on voters’ opinions. 
Even politically uninspiring, moderate politicians within bourgeois political parties such as Joe 
Biden and Pedro Sánchez have been branded as “unelectable, radical socialists by their opponents 
and the media. Moreover, if even being called socialist acts as a deterrent to political success, 
genuine socialists will have a tough time getting elected.  
 
Regardless, even if left-populist politicians gain the amount of support needed to lead 
individual countries here and there, it is unlikely that left-populism will have the immense effect 
on global politics that right-populism has. However, if there is a time for left-populists to capitalize 
and grow their clout, it is now, in an age where right-populism may very well be teetering on the 




The next decade will be a crucial one for political scientists and those who study populism 
to watch. What will the world look like in 2031? Will right-populism continue to grow and 
dominate, or will it fall into obscurity? Will left-populism take its place, or is it truly doomed to 
fail? Will neoliberal institutions regain the power they had before populism cast doubt on their 
efficacy? How will COVID affect how people view our politicians? For now, it is too early to tell. 
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